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| | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | | |
| 2 | NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION | | |
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| 4 | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, | | |
| 5 | Plaintiff | Case No. 1:18CR131 Akron, Ohio | |
| 6 | VS. | Wednesday, September 5, 2018 2:40 p.m. | |
| 7 | DAVID M. RICHARDS, | 2.10 p.m. | |
| 8 | Defendant. | | |
| 9 | | | |
| 10 | TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ADAMS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE | | |
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| 12 | A DDEA DANGEG | | |
| 13 | APPEARANCES: | | |
| 14 | For the Government: | Office of the U.S. Attorney - Cleveland | |
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| 22 | | | |
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| 25 | 1 | by mechanical stenography; transcript -aided transcription. | |
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Wednesday, September 5, 2018

THE COURT: For the record, the Court has before it today Case Number 1:18CR131. The case is United States of America versus David Richards. We're here today for sentencing.

Counsel for the government, are you ready to proceed?

MS. SKUTNIK: Yes, Your Honor. Carol Skutnik

from the U.S. Attorney's Office on behalf of the United

States of America.

THE COURT: On behalf of the defendant?

MR. LAZARUS: Yes, Your Honor. Jeff Lazarus,

Federal Public Defender's. We are ready to proceed.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I have before me -- I want to be certain everybody has the materials -- the presentence report, investigation report. I also have the parties' plea agreement. I have the sentencing memorandum submitted by the defendant. I also have a sentencing memorandum submitted by the government.

I also have received, and want to be certain both sides have it, I have the report from the Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Investigation, Report of Investigation which incorporates the statements, numerous statements of the defendant related to his prior history and conduct, etcetera, that I think are relevant.

| 1 | Counsel for the government, do you have all these | | |
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| 2 | materials? Do you have all the materials I just referenced? | | |
| 3 | If you were talking, I'll repeat it. | | |
| 4 | MS. SKUTNIK: No, Your Honor. I was showing Mr. | | |
| 5 | Lazarus a copy of the report that the Court was referencing | | |
| 6 | to make sure that he understood which report you were | | |
| 7 | referring to. I do have those materials, Your Honor. | | |
| 8 | I indicated to him that I believe the Court is | | |
| 9 | referring to report number 5 from the Department of Homeland | | |
| 10 | Security as it relates to the statements made to the agent | | |
| 11 | and then the polygraph materials made to Special Agent | | |
| 12 | Fragomeli. | | |
| 13 | THE COURT: That is correct. | | |
| 14 | Mr. Lazarus, have you seen it? | | |
| 15 | MR. LAZARUS: Your Honor, I received in | | |
| 16 | discovery I just want to make sure I'm looking at the | | |
| 17 | right one. This is the one that ends in 005 at the bottom? | | |
| 18 | THE COURT: At the very bottom, yes. It's | | |
| 19 | CL07QR18CL0008-005. | | |
| 20 | MR. LAZARUS: And that is a seven-page report? | | |
| 21 | THE COURT: Yes. It's dated February 23, 2018. | | |
| 22 | MR. LAZARUS: Yes. Then I have it, and I | | |
| 23 | reviewed it. | | |
| 24 | THE COURT: Additionally, it's my understanding | | |
| 25 | that there is a video recording made of the defendant's | | |

interview with the government. 1 2 MS. SKUTNIK: That is correct, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: How long is it? 4 MS. SKUTNIK: It is approximately 51 minutes 5 long, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: All right. At this point, I'll hear 7 from counsel. It's my intention to either have it played 8 here in open court so that we can see it, observe it, or if 9 the parties would like me to review it in camera, I can do 10 that as well. But I think it's important that I do that and 11 that it be made part of the record in the case. 12 I'll defer to Mr. Lazarus. MS. SKUTNIK: 13 MR. LAZARUS: Your Honor, I'm not sure what the 14 purpose of having the Court review that video is. Some of 15 that substance has already been memorialized into the report 16 and some of it has even been memorialized by the United 17 States' sentencing memorandum. I think that would be 18 duplicative and not really worth our time. 19 I don't think anything Mr. Richards said during that 20 interview is in contest. So I'm not sure what the value is 21 for that. We don't think it's --22 THE COURT: Well, the value is I could see the 23 defendant talk in great detail about the circumstances. Ι

can be sure that the details of the investigation, the

synopsis set forth by the agent, is completely accurate,

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there is no confusion about any of the statements that he 1 2 made. Wouldn't that be beneficial? 3 4 MR. LAZARUS: Your Honor, I'm letting the Court 5 know that myself and my client don't have any argument with 6 the report. So we believe the report fairly summarizes it 7 and is accurate. We don't think it needs to be reviewed. 8 THE COURT: Do you have any objection to me 9 reviewing it as part of my consideration of the sentence in 10 the case? 11 MR. LAZARUS: I just think it's duplicative. 12 THE COURT: It may be. I quess that's not my 13 question. Do you have an objection to me watching or 14 viewing the defendant making his statement so that I have 15 that information directly from his mouth, so to speak, 16 rather than relying upon the recitation set forth by the 17 agent? 18 Isn't it more -- wouldn't it certainly be more 19 beneficial to see his testimony in and of itself -- I 20 shouldn't say testimony. His statement. 21 What's the basis for your objection? 22 MR. LAZARUS: I don't think it needs to be done 23 in open court. 24 THE COURT: Why is that?

MR. LAZARUS: Your Honor, we sealed the briefs

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because there is some very sensitive information. Obviously there is sensitive information portrayed in that report. I don't think it benefits all of us to witness the entire 51 minutes of this video.

THE COURT: Well, isn't it probative of the nature and circumstances of the offense and isn't it probative of the history and characteristics of the defendant so that I can understand and you can all understand, we can all understand what it is we're trying to decide here?

A large part of this case is the reasons for the Court's sentence: Just punishment, adequate deterrence, protect the public, reflect the seriousness of the offense.

And the defendant's history and characteristics, his background, his prior experience, his sexual conduct, his conduct involving other minors allegedly, all of that, isn't that all something that's relevant here?

MR. LAZARUS: It's all relevant, and it's all summarized in the report by the agent. So I think all the relevant information is already memorialized and could be read by the Court and read through our various sentencing memoranda and the presentence report.

THE COURT: Well, counsel, does the government have a position?

MS. SKUTNIK: Well, Your Honor, as I noted in my

sentencing memorandum, I did supply this material to both — in both discovery to counsel and to the probation department.

However, the Court would note that in the summary of the facts of this case, it does not include a summary of any of the defendant's statements nor his admissions to prior sexual conduct as is included in the statements that I detailed in my memorandum which is why I put, for example, the polygraph statement verbatim in my memorandum.

But as the Court knows, the memorandum does not follow the defendant to the institution, and the fact that I have cited it in my memorandum does not make it part of the record.

And so I do think it would be appropriate and relevant to include the statements of the defendant either as summarized in this report done by the Department of Homeland Security as well as the written statement signed by Mr. Richards as part of the polygraph examination. I believe those should be made part of the record for purposes of this sentencing hearing.

And if the Court wishes to hear the video, I have the video prepared, however the Court wishes to proceed on the video. I do believe that Special Agent Guyton did do a very thorough report as it related to his interview, but I have also reviewed the video of the interview as well.

So however the Court would like to proceed on the video, but I do believe that his statements should definitely be part of the record as they have not been included in the PSR.

THE COURT: Well, the only thing that concerns me about — the only hesitation I have in playing the video is because it does reference the name of the defendant's daughter. And, again, she was a victim in his earlier gross sexual imposition case. So I believe that's my only hesitation.

Beyond that, I think -- again, I think it's beneficial to all of us to see Mr. Richards and how he comports himself and how he addresses the agents, all of the -- again, that's why we have, in some respects it's almost analogous to the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination so that we can all see and hear. And counsel can obviously then, if they wish, comment on what they see. We have the report.

And counsel for the defendant, if you're going to stipulate and agree that all the representations and information contained in the report is complete and accurate, and that is the report I've just referenced, if you want to make that stipulation and allow it to be included as part of the record in the case, then I will consider that in lieu of playing the video.

(Counsel confers with defendant.)

MR. LAZARUS: Your Honor, I have spoken with my 1 2 client. It's his desire to enter a stipulation to the 3 report as written in lieu of playing the recording. THE COURT: All right. Counsel, are you willing 4 5 to accept the stipulation? MS. SKUTNIK: I am, Your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: We'll note the stipulation. And I'll 8 make certain, I want to be sure that this report is part of the record. It's something that's important for the Court 9 10 in considering a sentence in the matter. 11 So let's make sure that -- we'll make sure that it's 12 part of the record. And, again, I intend on relying on it 13 and using it in some respects as it relates to sentencing. 14 With regard to -- just so it's clear, does anyone need 15 any additional time to review that report before we go 16 further? Anyone have any further desire, need? 17 I know it's been produced in discovery. Any 18 additional time needed to review that report of 19 investigation? 20 Counsel for the government? 21 MS. SKUTNIK: I'm prepared, Your Honor. 2.2 THE COURT: Counsel for the defendant? 23 MS. SKUTNIK: I have reviewed it. 24 THE COURT: Thank you. 25 Counsel for the defendant.

1 MR. LAZARUS: We're prepared. 2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 3 Mr. Richards, did you go over the presentence report 4 that was prepared to assist me in deciding your sentence in 5 the matter? 6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Counsel, did you review the report 8 with your client? 9 MR. LAZARUS: I did, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Thank you. The report indicates there is an objection by the 11 12 defendant. The defendant objects to multiple paragraphs, 13 paragraphs 34 to 38 and paragraph 45 which refer to other 14 criminal conduct. 15 "Mr. Richards objects to these four paragraphs -- " 16 and I'll read the objection so it's clear for the record. 17 "Mr. Richards objects to these four paragraphs and the 18 unfounded allegations they raise. For obvious reasons, Mr. 19 Richards and his ex-wife have a very tense relationship. 20 Ms. Walker is extremely angry at Mr. Richards for his 21 conduct in the case involving their daughter. Ms. Walker 2.2 has a number of mental health issues of her own as well. 23 The allegations she raises are totally unfounded, completely 24 untrue, and should not be admitted into this report. No

police reports were ever made regarding any of these

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allegations."

As to paragraph 38, the objection is, "For the same reasons in the preceding objection, the paragraph should be deleted. Ms. Walker's story is untrue, and Mr. Richards was never arrested or charged in connection with this.

Therefore, it is not an 'other arrest.'"

And paragraph 45, with regard to Ashley, that is the child victim in the gross sexual imposition case. The defendant argues, "She is not a victim in this case, and her desires for sentencing should not be included in the presentence report."

The probation officer's response is, "18 United States Code 3661 instructs that no limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence. As such, the probation officer maintains that the contested information is appropriately included for the Court to review."

It says, "The probation officer did not report any of the information in the contested paragraphs as fact but rather as additional inappropriate sexual behavior as recorded by others. Regardless of whether the contested paragraphs involve aggravated or mitigating circumstances, the probation officer maintains that the information is

permitted to be in the report. Additionally, this report is background information. It may be beneficial to the Bureau of Prisons and/or the U.S. probation officer supervising Mr. Richards during his term of supervised release. Moreover, there is no requirement binding the Court to consider these contested paragraphs when imposing a fair sentence."

Having heard the objection, I did confer with both counsel and suggest to counsel for the government that in light of the objection, if Ms. Walker is desirous of coming forward and testifying, that the Court would hear from her if the government so desired.

Counsel for the government, what's your position at this time regarding the objection?

MS. SKUTNIK: Your Honor, following our conversation, or I should say our hearing by telephone, I did contact Ms. Walker. She is present here in the courtroom and is prepared to speak before this Court.

I've also had an opportunity to speak with Mr. Lazarus prior to the commencement of our hearing. And we discussed whether or not it would be necessary for Ms. Walker to take the stand to repeat the matters that she has reported to the probation department and that are included in the PSR.

I believe the parties both agree -- and Mr. Lazarus can certainly correct me if I'm wrong. But the parties agree that the statements contained in the report made by

Ms. Walker are those of Ms. Walker. Those are her allegations of what was told to her and her recollections, or representation of her recollections, as it related to Mr. Richards, and that there are times when Mr. Richards' statements differ from Ms. Walker, however, there are a number of items that are discussed that are corroborated in part by the statements of Mr. Richards.

For example, the incident at the mall. There is a different version, but there is a reporting of that material.

So I say all that because I believe that the parties are recommending to this Court that it is not necessary for Ms. Walker to testify here before this Court at sentencing, but that her statements or her allegations may be considered by this Court for whatever weight the Court believes is appropriate to give the material, of course recognizing that Mr. Richards has not admitted or commented on some of the matters in there or may disagree with some of the representations. And I believe they are listed in the report as "alleged." That is the word that is included in there.

And frankly, even if she does testify, which she is willing to do today, it would not resolve the matter of whether or not those are in fact truthful because, frankly, those are her statements. She alleges them to be truthful.

And Mr. Richards objects or does not agree with all of the statements. And he has different allegations.

So I think that is our position. Mr. Lazarus can correct me if I'm wrong.

THE COURT: Wouldn't that give us an opportunity to, with all due respect, to judge, or consider, I should say, is a better term, Ms. Walker's credibility?

She can give her testimony if she would like, and then the defendant can test that testimony if he likes through cross-examination. Otherwise, I have the statements that she gave to probation officers which are in essence hearsay when she's here and present.

So I don't want it later on to be an issue on appeal that, oh, the Judge considered these other — this other offense conduct but I didn't have a chance to challenge it or to determine it's veracity, or what have you, because we have a witness. We have the person who has made the statements. And she is present.

MS. SKUTNIK: Your Honor, I don't want to speak for defense counsel. Perhaps he can make a representation as to how he would like to proceed.

THE COURT: I mean, I just find it difficult to say, Judge, we object to this being included. It's not true. And then the witness comes forward and says, well, I'm here. I will be glad to tell you exactly what I know,

and then decline to examine her and to test whether or not she's being truthful.

MR. LAZARUS: Your Honor, as far as her truthfulness, I guess as far as the credibility that these allegations were made to her, we don't really contest that, that she became aware of Mr. Richards — of allegations of sexual misconduct by Mr. Richards. She received those allegations, and we don't dispute that her receiving those allegations are credible.

But the question that still remains is whether the actual occurrences happened.

Now, if we interpret the presentence report as allegations and not actual fact, then we're satisfied. We understand that the allegations were made.

And specifically as to paragraphs 36 and 37, upon further talking with my client, it's our understanding that these actual paragraphs reference counts of his conviction from his Cuyahoga County case. So we actually don't even contest the truth of that because he did plead guilty to those.

As to paragraph 38, the incident that happened in the mall in Virginia, as Ms. Skutnik indicates in her sentencing memorandum on page 9, Mr. Richards actually made admissions that somewhat are consistent with what Ms. Walker's recollecting. There are some differences in the finer

points, but the conduct occurred nonetheless.

So we really don't take issue with most of the substance of it. We just want the Court to know that these are simply allegations and not actual facts.

And the Court can obviously rely on them in considering the 3553(a) factors. But our initial objection was to the form in which they were -- in which they were represented in the presentence report.

But based on Ms. Skutnik's representations to this Court, I believe that we concur with that that's how they're properly framed.

THE COURT: Let's read into the record what is at issue here, what you're objecting to.

According to the report, paragraph 34, "The following alleged information was obtained through independent interviews with the defendant's ex-wife, Laura Walker, and his daughter, Ashley." I'll defer reading her last name into the record.

"In 2002," paragraph 35, "while attending his mother's funeral, Richards allegedly attempted to put his hand up his four-year-old niece's dress. The information was told to Ashley by her aunt, the child's mother, following the defendant's 2006 conviction for gross sexual imposition against Ashley."

Paragraph 36, "In December of 2004, while at Walker's

mother's funeral," apparently the same event, "Richards allegedly groped Walker's 16-year-old cousin. Thereafter, a relative allegedly punched Richards in the face."

Paragraph 37, "In addition to all of the above, Laura Walker advised that the defendant groped four of her minor cousins at various family functions, graduation and holiday events, for years prior to his 2005 arrest; however, none of the children reported the incidents until after his arrest."

And then paragraph 38, "Although no record could be located to verify this information, Laura Walker advised the defendant was arrested for masturbating in a mall in Virginia in November of 1990. At the time they lived in Virginia for Richards' career in the U.S. Navy. Walker stated that the defendant was observed masturbating near the Santa section and exposed his penis to a woman working in a jewelry store on Black Friday. Walker advised that after a law enforcement officer called the residence to tell Richards of the warrant for his arrest, Richards violently raped --" and so forth. "According to Walker, witnesses failed to report to his court hearing, and Richards was acquitted of this charge in 1992."

So that is what Ms. Walker shared with the probation officer.

Ms. Skutnik, have you talked to her? Does she have any other information to share that might be of benefit for

either side in the case? 1 2 MS. SKUTNIK: Your Honor, I did not interview Ms. 3 Walker on today's date. I have communicated with her in the 4 past by -- I believe by one telephone call and also several 5 e-mails back and forth. 6 And her information generally focuses on the events 7 that she has delivered to the probation department. 8 THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 9 MS. SKUTNIK: Not on my behalf, Your Honor. THE COURT: Counsel for defendant? 10 11 MR. LAZARUS: No, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: So in essence you're indicating I can 13 rely on the information set forth in the report at 14 paragraphs 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38 as allegations made by the 15 defendant's ex-wife? 16 MR. LAZARUS: Your Honor, with that understanding 17 then, we would, I guess, defer to the Court. 18 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 19 Anything else before we turn to the advisory guideline 20 calculation? 21 MS. SKUTNIK: Nothing further from the United 22 States, Your Honor. 23 MR. LAZARUS: As far as objections to the 24 presentence report? Is that what the Court's referring to? 25 THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LAZARUS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: At this time the objections will be overruled for the reasons I've just stated. The facts as described have been set forth in the report. They're set forth as allegations based upon the representations of counsel that the Court can consider them and consider them as such.

I'll, again, overrule the objection, and they'll be set forth for whatever use that may be made of them. Again, the focus being on potentially corroboration by other means, by defendant's statement, etcetera.

Turning to the guideline calculation, there is a guideline calculation recommendation set forth at paragraph 15 of the parties' presentence investigation report -- excuse me, the parties' plea agreement. I stand corrected.

In terms of the guideline calculation in the PSI, that also -- a separate calculation has been made. And that calculation is set forth in the report.

And it begins at page -- just a moment. We have quite an extensive report. The calculation in the report, or in the parties' plea agreement, calls for a base offense level of 22.

A prepubescent minor or minor under the age of 12, the advisory guideline enhancement of two levels.

There is a two-level recommended guideline computation for knowing distribution of two levels.

And then there is a sadistic or masochistic material enhancement of four levels.

There is the use of the computer of two levels.

And the 600 or more images is a five-level enhancement.

And then there is an enhancement -- or a subtotal before acceptance of responsibility of 37.

That is what is recommended by the parties.

The probation department has included an additional enhancement in this matter. And that is four levels because of the pattern of conduct, as I understand the additional four levels that the probation staff has recommended.

Counsel for the government, am I correct, that is the position of the probation staff?

MS. SKUTNIK: Your Honor, according to the plea agreement, the parties reserved the right to argue over whether or not the pattern of activity enhancement applied. The government does advocate and believe that the pattern of activity enhancement applies, and the defendant reserved the right to object to that guideline enhancement.

And the Court is correct that the report does, in paragraph 21, apply -- or I'm sorry. I quoted the wrong one. In paragraph 19, the probation department does apply a

five-level enhancement for pattern of activity involving the 1 2 sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. 3 THE COURT: Under 2G2.2(b)(5). 4 Counsel for the defendant, why do you object or why do 5 you believe it does not apply? 6 MR. LAZARUS: Your Honor, we don't object. While 7 we reserved the right in our plea, upon review of the 8 presentence report, we do not have an objection to the 9 enhancement. The Court did reference that it was four levels. It's 10 11 actually five levels under subsection (b) (5). 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 MR. LAZARUS: So we do not have an objection to 14 that enhancement. 15 THE COURT: I'll stand corrected. Then the 16 offense level becomes a 39. 17 And the criminal history category is a II. 18 And subject to -- does the government seek a downward 19 adjustment for acceptance of responsibility? 20 MS. SKUTNIK: The government would make that 21 motion, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: So from the 39 there would be a 23 three-level downward adjustment. And therefore the total 24 offense level becomes a 36 in this case. 25 At offense level 36, criminal history category II, the

advisory quideline range is 210 to 262 months. 1 2 Counsel for the government, do you have any objection 3 to the calculation? 4 MS. SKUTNIK: Your Honor, I believe that the 5 defendant's adjusted offense level is a 42 and then a 39 6 after acceptance. 7 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I do stand corrected. 8 You're right. I was looking at the other calculation. So, therefore, the 39 would apply. 9 10 Counsel for the defendant, do you have any objection 11 to the guideline calculation, please, other than your 12 arguments for variance, etcetera? 13 MR. LAZARUS: We just want to make sure that the 14 Court is correct. At 39/II, the range under the quidelines 15 table is 239 to 265 months, but because of the statutory 16 maximum it's capped at 240 months which would be the 17 quideline range. We concur with that. 18 THE COURT: I agree. Thank you, counsel. 19 That would be the quideline range, again, subject to 20 arguments for variance or departure, although departures are 21 prohibited under the Protect Act. So we will deal with, of 22 course, the various arguments for a variance. 23 Counsel for the defendant, I have reviewed your

What if any additional argument would you like to make

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extensive briefing.

as it relates to this case, please?

MR. LAZARUS: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, we're asking this Court to consider a variance below the sentencing guidelines range, below the statutory maximum, as Mr. Richards is not the worst of the worst offenders who would deserve a statutory maximum sentence.

I want the Court to know that from the moment that this case began, from the moment that I began representing Mr. Richards, he has admitted to his offense, that he has expressed significant remorse. He recognizes the harm that he's caused his family in his actions in this case and in his actions in the past, and he recognizes the harm that his offense has caused to the victims. And he has expressed great sorrow and great remorse for that.

He also wants the Court to know that he knows that he has a problem. He knows that he has severe mental health issues, and his attraction to these types of images and material is something that obviously he should not be doing. But he wants the Court to know that he has a problem, that he wants treatment, and that he knows that he will be serving a significant sentence in the Bureau of Prisons to get him the help he needs and get him the treatment that he needs.

But we want the Court to consider several mitigating

factors. And before I talk about the specific factors that apply to Mr. Richards, I want to talk just briefly about the quidelines generally.

As we discussed in our sentencing memorandum, we believe that the sentencing guideline range, while factually applicable, overly inflates his sentencing guidelines range.

There is certain -- obviously the Court has gone through the litany of sentencing enhancements that apply in this case. And Mr. Richards gets, you know, almost every enhancement there is. And these take his offense level from a base offense level 22 to a total offense level of 42 before acceptance of responsibility.

Some of these enhancements are applied in virtually every case involving these types of images. And we believe that when an enhancement is imposed in 95 percent of the cases or more, it doesn't actually qualify as an enhancement.

We're not saying it doesn't factually apply. And we're not saying that the whole 2G2.2 should be thrown out and scrapped. We're just saying the Court can consider the fact when these enhancements are piled up in each and every single case, that they result in a sentencing guidelines range that is greater than necessary and warrants some consideration of a variance.

And the Court can do that, can disagree with the

policy under Supreme Court case law that's cited in our brief.

But I want to focus specifically on three enhancements.

Use of a computer. So Mr. Richards gets two levels because this offense is committed with a computer.

Now, having practiced in Federal Court now for ten years, I have not seen a case that doesn't involve this enhancement. This enhancement comes in in each and every one of these cases.

So to say that this offense is enhanced because of the use of a computer is somewhat duplications. It's double counting. And it imposes a sentence that is a base offense level — or a total offense level that is higher than we need.

THE COURT: Hasn't the Circuit rejected that argument directly, that the imposition of 2G2 -- or I'm sorry, the imposition of the use of a computer is not double counting? Isn't there a published opinion on that point?

MR. LAZARUS: They have not said that as a matter of law it is automatically double counting, but the Court does have discretion to consider that.

And several of your colleagues have rejected that enhancement. I know for a fact that Judge Polster and Judge Zouhary routinely give a two-level variance because of these

issues, because they believe it is double counting. 1 2 So the Court has discretion to consider that under the 3 3553(a) factors. We're not saying as a matter of law it 4 needs to be scrapped or thrown out. 5 THE COURT: No. That is not my question. 6 there a Sixth Circuit case -- I think I have one on my desk 7 as I prepared -- that says it is not double counting to 8 apply the use of the computer enhancement? 9 MR. LAZARUS: And we're not --10 THE COURT: Isn't that the state of the law 11 currently? 12 MR. LAZARUS: We're not saying it is 13 automatically double counting. But we're just saying the 14 Court can consider the fact that this enhancement keeps 15 coming up time and time again in every case in considering 16 what is the appropriate guideline range and what should be 17 the appropriate sentence. 18 So the Court is correct that it is not automatically 19 double counting. But it is something the Court can consider 20 in a wide range of other factors under 3553(a).

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

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MR. LAZARUS: And the same is true of the victim under 12. I'm not going to make the same argument, but the same reasoning does apply.

As far as the number of images, we want the Court to

know that in a case --

THE COURT: Why does that apply, because isn't it certainly an aggravating circumstance if, if — these cases are so difficult, but if an individual, like this defendant, is attracted to individuals as young as six years old, six to twelve, children, young children, isn't that an aggravating circumstance?

Isn't that something that I should be considering rather than someone who is attracted to 15, 16, 17? All illegal. All inappropriate. But certainly on the scale of these things -- and it's hard to, again, place them on some scale.

I have a hard time with an argument that I shouldn't consider it aggravating that a person likes to watch young children being raped at the age of six or seven or doesn't get some sort of gratification from that, that that's not an aggravating circumstance, that that's not a circumstance that should give me cause and concern and increase the guideline range.

MR. LAZARUS: Well, Your Honor is bringing up two separate enhancements at once. One is the victim under 12, and the second is the sadistic or masochistic.

A child being raped would incorporate both of those enhancements and give a six-level. We're talking specifically about the child under 12. And as cited in our

brief, that enhancement is imposed in over 95 percent of the circumstances.

So while philosophically --

THE COURT: Which enhancement? One or both?

MR. LAZARUS: The victim under 12. The sadistic masochistic has less frequency.

So focusing specifically on the victim under 12, that enhancement is given in 95 percent or almost every case.

So while we can talk about the philosophy, obviously that is an aggravating factor. When that aggravating factor is imposed in virtually every case, we believe it unjustly and irrationally aggravates his sentencing range.

THE COURT: Well, I haven't heard from the government, but I guess I'll tell you out of hand, having presided over some of these cases -- and they are all difficult; they're all very difficult -- as a policy matter I reject that argument.

I think it's clearly appropriate -- and the Commission may have considered it. It's clearly appropriate that there be some sort of enhancement under the guidelines for children under 12. I reject out of hand any policy argument that the mere fact -- unfortunately, tragically, so many of the victims are children under 12, that as a policy matter I should consider that and not impose that enhancement, or in some way, shape, or form modifying the sentence.

I think to the contrary, as the guidelines counsel, I think if the child or victim is under 12, then I think there should be some sort of enhancement. As a policy matter, I would think there should be a greater enhancement if the child is under six.

MR. LAZARUS: Your Honor -
THE COURT: Strictly as a policy matter.

I mean, I'm just being candid with you. That argument doesn't hold a whole lot of water, particularly when you're talking about children, little victims who are children.

So next argument is to sadistic/masochistic. You want to argue that that --

MR. LAZARUS: We're not arguing that.

THE COURT: I would hope not.

MR. LAZARUS: But, Your Honor, there is a difference between the abstract of how bad these images are, how these cases are actually being prosecuted, and when the enhancements are coming in.

It's our position that when an enhancement is imposed every time, in every single case, that it's inherent in the offense and should not be considered an aggravating factor.

THE COURT: Well, that's just related to the guidelines. That's just a guideline calculation. That has nothing to do with -- once again, we can go beyond the guidelines, and we look at the facts and circumstances, the

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nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant. We look at a wide range of other information.

The guidelines are the benchmark. They're the starting point. But to argue that, again, that the guidelines are in some way, shape, or form either misguided or I shouldn't follow them, you know, philosophically, I disagree. Actually I disagree with my colleagues.

I think philosophically the guidelines are appropriate in these kind of cases, that we are far too often focused on who? The defendant. We're not thinking about the victims. And that's why when you argue that, again, the enhancement is applied across the board for children under 12, I say to myself, wait a minute. What about the victims? What about the victims? Let's talk about them.

MR. LAZARUS: Yes, Your Honor. And Mr. Richards has great remorse for the harm that he has caused these victims. And we understand that, and he knows that he is going to get a significant sentence because of the harm that he caused these victims.

But we're trying to figure out what is an appropriate sentence for this case.

THE COURT: Again, let me help you out, perhaps.

The focus here should be -- the challenge that you have in this case is not the guidelines. The challenge is

not the guidelines. If I use the guideline range, a lower guideline range, the challenge is not the guidelines.

The challenge is the history and characteristics of the defendant, his prior conviction for GSI, his admitted, if you read his statements to law enforcement, his admitted pattern of attraction to young children, six to twelve, I think, if I recall his statement correctly.

And the pattern that he has had of being sexually attracted to children, including his own daughter's classmates, those are the kinds of things that make it difficult.

When you have a defendant who is not some -- and again, I'm not minimizing looking at pictures. But here we have what we call, in the words of the Commission, a hands-on -- the commission's report. We have a hands-on offender, right?

MR. LAZARUS: That's correct.

THE COURT: So that makes this case entirely different than the kinds of cases I think you're trying to compare and contrast it with. All the disparities that you talk about in terms of the guidelines don't carry a lot of weight when you think about -- again, you can distinguish all that from defendants who are -- you look at the nature of the pictures they have. We can talk about that. You look at his involvement with others in the community. We

know about that. We have the chats, right? He's chatting with other like-minded individuals. This investigation began in New Zealand, right?

MR. LAZARUS: That's right.

THE COURT: So we have that.

And then we also have the prior history of hands-on offending which puts this defendant in -- again, most challenging for you, this puts this defendant right in the crosshairs of what the Commission has said when you talk about the guidelines, at least in my mind, the more appropriate in many ways, at least equally important considerations.

So you can argue the guidelines back and forth with me, back and forth. And I want to be fair. But the guidelines really aren't what drives the sentence in this case. No way, shape, or form.

What drives this case is the history and characteristics of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of this offense. We know what this is about. But his prior history is what's really most difficult.

And then we have the need for the sentence. What do we do with someone who has, over many years, involved himself in -- is sexually attracted to children, admittedly, and who has acted out on that behavior.

MR. LAZARUS: That's correct, Your Honor. And

Your Honor, he is looking at a significant sentence, and the guidelines do give him a significant penalty for that with the five levels for the pattern activity and the increase in his criminal history score.

So part of his history is taken into account in the guidelines because of the offenses he has in the past.

But we want the Court to know that the prior hands-on offenses that we're all talking about are 15, 20, 30 years old. That if we look at this offense that Mr. Richards committed, it is a fairly typical child pornography offense. We're talking about Mr. Richards being involved in posting links online. And the amount of images that were found on his computer is relatively small compared to most other child pornography offenses. We're talking about less than 20 videos and several hundred images.

So he gets five levels under the guidelines for that, whereas if he had 10,000 or 100,000 or a million images, he would get the same guidelines enhancement.

So we just want the Court to understand the facts and circumstances of this offense.

But more importantly as to this offense, Mr. Richards admitted his conduct. We want the Court to consider the fact that from the moment that law enforcement came to his door and started asking him questions, he admitted his involvement. He's never denied that he was involved in

these types of images. He has never denied his conduct. He admitted to law enforcement. He gave a full confession. He submitted to a polygraph examination.

He then came to this Court and pled guilty and has accepted responsibility, allocuted -- he's going to allocute later before this Court.

But we also want the Court to consider his history and circumstances because obviously there are a lot of negative things in there. But it's not all negative. And we want the Court to consider some of the positive things that have gone on in his life and some of the things that happened in his childhood that are not an excuse for his behavior but help to paint a clearer picture of how someone could become this damaged and could have these types of problems based on the things that happened to him and the traumas that happened to him as a child.

He was molested himself. He was abused. I'm not going to go through all the specifics because the Court has read our sentencing memorandum. But he was taken advantage of by older men, by older boys in the neighborhood. He was treated unfairly. He was abused. He was subjected to the same abuse that some of the victims of his current offense have been subjected to.

And Mr. Richards went through and graduated high school. And shortly after high school he joined the

military. And he spent over 20 years in the United States Navy. He served this country.

And we want the Court to understand that he has done some good things in his life. He takes much pride in serving his country and being an active member in the United States Navy which he was able to demonstrate his devotion to this country.

His offense doesn't negate that. His offense doesn't make it that it didn't happen. We just want the Court to understand that he did spend a significant period of his adult life devoted to our armed services.

And then, once that was completed, he then went into the work force. He has a significant work history which is detailed in our sentencing memorandum. He worked a number of jobs, some of which for many years at a time. He worked for our own federal probation office for seven years in human resources. He was able to get a job in the Veteran's Administration.

He's really, other than the time that he was incarcerated, he was either employed or in the Navy for his entire adult life. And we believe that that is significant and takes him to a point where he is different from many of the other defendants that come before this Court for similar offenses.

David knows that his offense is heinous. He knows

what he has done to his family and to his victims. And he understands that it is reprehensible and something he has great shame for. He has never denied that.

But in focussing on this offense, we have a relatively small number of images that we're dealing with here. We -
THE COURT: When you say "relatively small," is it not 600, but when you count the videos, aren't we at

1,600 or plus?

MR. LAZARUS: That's correct.

THE COURT: Weren't there a substantial amount being -- not that we can hold that against him, but I think the evidence is that he would delete -- he would receive and then delete a great deal. Is that not?

MR. LAZARUS: Well, the ones that were deleted were recovered by forensic review by law enforcement. So those are taken into account in the total number.

What we're talking about, I believe, the note is 18 videos which ends up being over 1,000 images just based on the calculation. So that is taken into account. But in comparison to the other similar child pornography cases, this is a relatively small number. Most of the cases that come before these courts dealing with these child pornography offenses are talking about hundreds or thousands of videos and thousands upon thousands of pictures.

So we want the Court to consider this offense and the

with?

conduct we have here which is relatively small compared to the vast number of cases. And we believe that that's something the Court should consider in determining sentencing disparities and the appropriate sentence.

We also want the Court to consider David's mental health. David has a long history of mental health issues.

He was receiving treatment for them.

He suffered from post traumatic stress disorder and anxiety. He was receiving services from the VA for over ten

THE COURT: What issues?

years. He was trying to deal with these issues.

MR. LAZARUS: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: What issues was he trying to deal

MR. LAZARUS: He was trying to deal with the issues that were related to his attraction to children.

THE COURT: What evidence is there of that? Do you have any statement from the VA?

I'm just -- I'm curious. Do we have a doctor or someone who has rendered a report indicating that he was receiving counseling?

I understood that he was receiving some counseling for depression or some other type of illness. I didn't see anything to reflect the fact that he was receiving counseling related to his attraction to children.

MR. LAZARUS: I reviewed about 500 pages of 1 2 Veteran's Administration records. There is no specific 3 reference to him being attracted to children in those 4 records. But -- and I have tried to contact the doctor, but 5 I was not able to contact her. 6 Mr. Richards does tell me that this was something he 7 disclosed, that he did have this attraction. 8 THE COURT: Is there anything in his records? 9 I'm sorry. You told me there was not. 10 MR. LAZARUS: There is not. 11 THE COURT: So there is nothing in the record 12 saying, "discussed with Mr. Richards" or "discussed with 13 David today his attraction to children"? That was not part 14 of the psychiatric record? 15 MR. LAZARUS: The specific issues that he 16 discussed other than the actual diagnosis were not 17 discussed. So they diagnosed him as having depression or 18 anxiety and post traumatic stress disorder, but there was no 19 reference to the specific topics that were discussed. 20 But we wouldn't expect to see that in these Veteran's 21 Administration records. 22 THE COURT: Why would you not? If I'm someone 23 who has this attraction -- he was very forthright with the 24 agent about his ongoing constant attraction to children.

Why would he not talk to his counselor, his psychiatrist,

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and say, you know, I think I have this problem and maybe I'm a pedophile. You know, I hate to use that term. But I've had this ongoing problem.

Why would that not be something you would want to discuss with a psychiatrist? Isn't that a lack of insight? Isn't that someone who is perhaps more dangerous if they're not trying to reach out and get help?

I mean, he receives a VA disability. So he's not paying for these services. So he has the option or the opportunity to get that kind of help. That's another question.

MR. LAZARUS: Well, Your Honor, we just want the Court to understand that he was seeking treatment. He was seeking help because he knew that he had a problem and he wanted to address that. So we believe that that is something that the Court can consider, that he was trying to seek it out.

We also want the Court to consider the fact that he has letters of support which the Court has attached to our sentencing memorandum. And there is a number of people in the community who know David and who think highly of him despite his offenses. They're all aware of his prior conviction, and they're aware of what he's currently — why he's before the Court. But they believe that he is a good person deep down.

Heather Hoty, who is referenced in one of our letters, is here in the courtroom today. She has been very helpful and she stands by David.

The other letters that we have referenced are all people in the community, none of which have criminal records, who know David from either church or just from the community. And they believe that deep down he is a good person, that he has done good things in his life. And we want the Court to consider that.

In total, obviously these offenses speak for itself. The Court is aware and David is aware that this is a reprehensible and terrible offense in which people were victimized.

David also understands he has a history dating back over 30 years of hands-on offenses and that the Court has considered that and is aware of that.

But he has done some good things in his life. He has worked. He has been in the military, and he has developed a community support system. And he recognizes his mental health issues.

But he wants the Court to know that given all of that, given all the consideration of his background and all the things that he has done, that he is not the top end, that he does not warrant the statutory maximum in this case.

And we believe that the Court should impose a variance

that adequately reflects his history and circumstances and 1 2 the mitigating things in his life. 3 And it will be a significant sentence that does 4 properly account for his offense and for the victims in this 5 case. 6 So we're asking the Court to impose a variance at 7 sentencing accordingly. 8 Thank you. 9 THE COURT: All right, sir. Thank you. 10 Mr. Richards, what if any statement do you want to 11 make on your own behalf, please? 12 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. Good afternoon, 13 Your Honor. I thank you. 14 As you may understand, Your Honor, I'm very nervous. 15 If it please the Court. 16 THE COURT: Relax. Just take your time. There 17 is no reason to be nervous. I know this is an important and 18 difficult day. Take your time. 19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 20 I would like to read from a prepared statement. 21 Your Honor, I do thank you for the opportunity to 22 address this Honorable Court. Mere words cannot express my 23 sorrow, shame, and remorse for my actions. So with this

Honorable Court's leave, please permit me to express in the

strongest possible language that I am sincerely remorseful

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and that I am deeply and humbly mortified by my behavior.

I apologize, first and foremost, to all persons and their families victimized by my actions as well as to my family, friends, former coworkers, and veterans for any pain, embarrassment, shame, breakdown of trust that my behavior has caused.

I recognize that the relentless sharing of images such as these perpetuates the victimization of each human being involved. And for my participation in that activity, I am humiliated and I am truly sorry.

Your Honor, my life has not been all about my offenses. I wish to communicate to this Court that you not perceive me as such. I know that I have a problem. I have tried to abstain from this behavior.

To make up for any wrongdoings, I have tried to better myself and better those around me. I earned my bachelor's degree at the age of 61. I have done volunteer work to help those less fortunate, trying to make amends. This includes serving as an elder, a lector, usher, a Eucharist minister with my church, as well as serving as a volunteer with the Cuyahoga County Animal Shelter, Wheels on Meals, Habitat for Humanity, WVIZ Public TV, Harvest For Hunger, and the Combined Federal Campaign.

Your Honor, I genuinely do wish to obtain treatment by participating in the RDAP program as well as any sex

offender treatment program deemed suitable by the Court.

I wish to participate in 12-step programs offered by Life Recovery, and SLAA, Sex and Love Addicts Anonymous.

Upon release, I plan to reconnect with the services offered by the Veteran's Administration to continue my counseling and treatment.

My primary goal is to help others, especially veterans, who suffer from pornography addiction.

Your Honor, I wish, through counseling, treatment, and accountability, to effect a sincere and permanent change in my lifestyle, never to engage in these shameful and damaging activities again.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

Counsel for the government, what's the government's position regarding this matter, please?

MS. SKUTNIK: Thank you, Your Honor.

I know that this Court has had the opportunity to review the government's sentencing memorandum, and I have tried to give a very thorough picture to this Court of what the government is aware of as it relates to Mr. Richards' history and characteristics as well as the facts of the case before this Court today.

Your Honor, I would submit to this Court that Mr. Richards is the poster child for 240 months; that he is the

poster child for the maximum sentence in this type of case.

This is a sentencing for the charge of receipt and distribution of child pornography. And counsel for the defense tries to distinguish this case, to minimize this case, and to minimize the prior behavior of Mr. Richards. And I would just like to make a few, hopefully brief, remarks as it relates to that.

First of all, this Court has in the past and has today expressed a rejection of a wholesale dismissal of the guidelines. I simply want to point out a couple of important things.

When law enforcement works these cases — and I have worked along with them and I have reviewed these images that they have discovered on computers. I have watched the categories that they have marked. There is a category that they mark that's "suspected child pornography" when, according to case law, they do the same thing a jury would do, they look at the image and they try to determine if they can establish that that minor depicted in the image or the video is in fact somebody who is under the age of 18 pursuant to the federal definition.

A child that is prepubescent is fairly easy to recognize and fairly easy to acknowledge and to count with significant confidence as a minor. And so those images are readily marked as suspected child pornography because the

child has minimal development, unlikely to have pubic hair, and minimal breast development or development of the genitals.

What gets far more difficult are images of a child that has begun to go through the process of puberty. And so what you frequently find in these cases are categories of either "age difficult" or what they call "child erotica." And those are images that they cannot neatly place into that little bin.

And so, of course, you will see the frequency of the enhancement for prepubescent because if I don't have a known victim of a postpubescent child, it is very difficult to bring a case with evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that that is in fact a minor.

And so that is a law enforcement technique and strategy, and it makes sense that that is what you would see in these enhancements because that's how we engage in our investigations.

The other thing that I would point out is I have prosecuted many, many cases that were being brought by the United States Postal Service of people who had received, still to this day, child pornography through the United States mail. That is a case that does not involve the use of a computer.

And in fact, and frankly, the introduction of the

Internet and computers has blown this industry exponentially and the harm to the children exponentially. And the fact that that only counts for two levels really to me seems to minimize the effect of the Internet on these poor victims whose images now reach all of the corners of the earth.

The other thing that I would simply point out on that argument is that the guidelines for child pornography offenses are artificially low. The base offense was set at a 22 which is artificially low such that when you add two levels for prepubescent minor and for use of a computer you only get to a 26 which puts us at or around the mandatory minimum term for these types of offenses.

Moving on, Your Honor, from that, I would like to focus a little bit more on some of the remarks that were made about the size of the defendant's collection in this case.

So still sticking with and focusing on the facts in this case, the indication and the argument to this Court is that the number of images possessed or that was in the cache of Mr. Richards' collection is small and that we have seen many, many other cases where the numbers are far larger.

And if this was Mr. Richards' first time that he ever appeared before a court, if he was never before a court before for matters concerning child pornography, that may be a more valid argument.

But what do we know about Mr. Richards? Well, we know that it wasn't his first foray into the criminal justice system.

I also indicated in my sentencing memorandum and point out that the defendant admitted that in 2012, the Ohio ICAC knocked on the exact same door, put him in the exact same van, or a van, I should say, very much identical to the van that he was interviewed in in connection with this case because they had probable cause to execute a search warrant at his home, to suspect that he was engaged in child exploitation behavior, child pornography.

And Mr. Richards proudly professed to law enforcement that ICAC didn't find anything on his computers. And there were no images that were found.

I reviewed that interview. I watched his same sheepish presentation. Woe is me. I'm so sorry. Somebody reached out to me. They wanted me to do a tribute photo. And I simply shut down that communication and I stopped speaking with them, and that was the end of that, which is not entirely true.

But the fact of the matter is, law enforcement knocked on his door in 2012. And so Mr. Richards has learned from that experience. What Mr. Richards has learned is that when law enforcement comes knocking on your door with a search warrant in connection with child pornography, they're going

to look at your computer devices. They're going to get in there. They're going to find what's in there. They're going to find your search history. They're going to find the images that you have saved.

Last time he had successfully deleted all material.

This time he went a different route. He didn't store child pornography the way that many of what I would now consider less experienced offenders do. He didn't place it on external hard drives. He didn't put it on disks or CD's. And frankly he didn't store it in nice little file paths on his computer the way that some folks do because he knew that he had a never-ending supply of child pornography when he got on that website.

When he got on that website, there was like-minded individuals who were sharing links of child pornography that he could access without storing them and downloading them to his computer where he could get caught.

The other thing that counsel says is, well, Mr.

Richards immediately admitted his behavior in this case. He was forthcoming. He was honest. And he gave a full confession.

And, Your Honor, I would submit to you that that is because as Mr. Richards sat in that van that day, he knew that there was law enforcement in his house that were seizing his devices, that would forensically review them,

and they would find that material.

So I don't think he should get a whole lot of credit for saying, you know, yes, you will find child pornography on my computer when you know darn well that forensically that's exactly what they're going to do, and also because they told him that they were there because they had evidence that he had been engaged in child exploitation behavior.

And so when you couch what he did and what he said and how he behaved in the much bigger picture, it's not really much of an argument in his favor.

The other thing I would say is that he lied to the agent. The agent repeatedly pressed him. And he told this agent that the only reason why he pled guilty to the gross sexual imposition case was to get it over with and basically to spare anyone from having to testify.

And then it wasn't until later when he was polygraphed that he ultimately admits that he was engaged in some type of sexual touching of his daughter and others which at least would be more consistent with the plea that he entered into in the prior gross sexual imposition, sexual imposition cases.

The defense counsel submits to this Court that Mr. Richards has a history of approximately 30 years. And if I do the math, it looks more like 38 years.

He submits to you that you should consider his service

to the United States as a mitigating factor. I would submit to you that during his service, he exploited children overseas.

And what really sticks out in my mind about his description of those offenses that I have included in my sentencing memorandum on page 7, referencing activity in the Philippines, is this statement. He said, "None of my sexual contact with these minors was nonconsensual."

Talking about 12 to 14 year old girls, "none of my sexual contact with these minors was nonconsensual," as if a child of that age in those conditions could consent to the sexual activity described.

That's just the beginning. That's just what we know. That's the tip of the iceberg, I would submit to this Court, that we know about what has transpired over the nearly 40 years of Mr. Richards' access to children in the community.

The incident that occurred in the mall is incredibly troubling for so many reasons. And again, Mr. Richards says to you, Your Honor, I want treatment. And I say BS, because you had an opportunity to have treatment.

After he got caught in the mall, he could have sought treatment. He had the resources. He had the ability to do that. He had an opportunity to seek treatment after his conviction.

There is no indication that he received treatment as

part of --

THE COURT: Just to be fair, I think he did, according to the report, have some sort of treatment while he served his state sentence.

I just -- again, I want to be sure that we don't -- probation staff might be able to point me to that paragraph, but I seem to recall that he did receive, or there was some effort made.

And I know treatment options are limited, and I don't know whether it was part of his ten years of post -- or parole, whether they, they meaning the state, ordered treatment for him as conditions of his sentence back in the time frame in question.

I know I read it somewhere. Or at least I believe I did.

Am I mistaken, or did I miss it here? I'm sorry to interrupt your presentation, but I think it's an important point.

MS. SKUTNIK: Your Honor, I'm reviewing paragraph 31 which speaks of his prior conviction. I don't see it there. And I'm also reviewing paragraph 48 which is the category of mental and emotional health, and I don't see it referenced there.

I'm not sure if there was -- I don't recall there being something in defendant's memorandum to that effect.

THE COURT: Did you locate any information?

THE PROBATION OFFICER: Your Honor, all I'm aware of is the stuff at the VA for his depression.

THE COURT: All right. Perhaps I was in error then.

I'm sorry. Go ahead, counsel, if you would like to finish your argument. I apologize for interrupting. I'll continue to look and see if I might have located it somewhere in the report.

I would be surprised if the state system, with a 17-month sentence, if he was afforded any treatment in custody. But that's a different matter.

MS. SKUTNIK: And frankly, Your Honor, I can argue that both ways. He either didn't receive treatment, or if he did as part of a court-ordered period of supervision to follow his incarceration, what it indicates to me is that it was not successful because Mr. Richards has a profound and prolific sexual attraction to prepubescent female children and one that was not curtailed, if he did receive treatment, or that he wasn't honest about when he received treatment because, frankly, if you're not forthcoming, it's garbage in, garbage out.

And we know that as early as 2012, he had another knock on his door. He had another opportunity to try to arrest the beast, to receive help.

But when I look at the discussion of him receiving mental health services from the VA, it says nothing about trying to deal with a sexual attraction to children. It talked about relationships with his daughter and difficulties sleeping at night.

So it's hard to accept as genuine that now, 38 years later, we're still listening to, oh, I'm profoundly sorry. Please accept my apologies. I want help. I'm so sad. Because the defendant has never taken sincere steps to arrest his behavior and to curtail the harm that he causes to our children.

Your Honor, I know, again, I've probably gone longer than I had originally intended. But it is so rare that I stand here before the Court with so many things to argue that in my mind, under the 3553(a) factors, warrant the maximum sentence, which in this case is 240 months. But I believe that that is what this case calls for, and I submit or request that that is the sentence of the Court.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.

Anyone else? Mr. Lazarus, anything else you would like to add?

MR. LAZARUS: Your Honor, just to go to the Court's question that Mr. Richards, while he was in the state prison in Madison Correctional, he did do sex offender

calling to my attention now?

treatment while incarcerated. And then while on post release control he was receiving treatment in the community.

THE COURT: Is that something in your brief? Is that where I found it, or is that something you're just

MR. LAZARUS: The part of Madison Correctional is on page 20 of my brief.

I don't believe him receiving treatment is in my memorandum.

I have the same recollection as you. I know I saw it somewhere. I just can't remember exactly where.

THE COURT: Makes me feel better that I just didn't pull it out of thin air.

In any event, the Court would note for the record I've carefully considered the matter. It's an extraordinarily difficult case as most, if not all, of these are. And I will set forth the reasons for the Court's sentence.

We begin with the nature and circumstances of the offense. The defendant is before the Court having pled guilty to receipt and distribution of visual depiction of minors engaged in explicit conduct.

In 2017, using the online name She's Ten and another name that I won't read into the record, given the nature of it, the defendant distributed at least 29 images depicting child pornography through an Internet based chat room.

During a search of his residence in February of 2018, agents located a computer that contained 342 child pornography images, 18 video files depicting child exploitation.

The defendant admitted possessing the aforementioned material and distributing child pornography images through an Internet chat room.

And we'll talk about it more later, but the defendant gave an extensive and detailed statement outlining the nature and circumstances of the offense as well as a great deal of information about his prior history and other matters that are, of course, relevant.

And I will incorporate by reference, as we had some discussion earlier, the report from Homeland Security. The defendant's statement is remarkably candid and sets forth a great deal of materials about his prior history and his sexual interest in children.

The history and characteristics of the defendant.

He's 61 years old. He was adopted as an infant, reared by his adoptive parents in Toledo, Ohio.

He had some difficulties, according to the defendant's sentencing brief or memorandum, I believe, some difficulties as a student in the school system. I believe he was in a Catholic school, if I'm not mistaken, according to the briefing by the defendant, and had difficulties as a

student.

And after graduating high school, he enlisted and served in the U.S. Navy for 20 years before obtaining a job as a human resources representative in our probation office in Cleveland, Ohio.

He eventually lost that job as a result of his conviction for gross sexual imposition against his prepubescent daughter in 2006.

After completing a 17-month term of incarceration, Mr. Richards worked in multiple restaurants before most recently obtaining a human resources job at the Veteran's hospital in Cleveland.

In 2017, he earned a Bachelor's degree from Notre Dame College of Ohio, and months later he was arrested for the instant offense.

Mr. Richards has two children, one of who was the victim of his first sexual offense conviction, and the other child that he never met as a result of his restriction of being around minors.

Prior to his arrest, he did pay child support for his younger daughter.

His older daughter is estranged from her father based upon the earlier events in question, but most recently this, obviously these charges and convictions, have further estranged the parties. And she is, of course, not

communicating with her father because of this matter.

The defendant is a criminal history category II as a result of accumulating three criminal history points for a prior sex conviction in 2006.

In that case Mr. Richards engaged in sexual contact with his biological daughter when she was between the ages of 7 and 13 by repeatedly touching her in various areas of her body, her buttocks, her breasts, and thigh areas, according to his daughter.

Their family has reason to believe the defendant has possibly committed other unverified sexual offenses against children that was never reported to law enforcement authorities. Notably against a prepubescent child in the '80s and against a niece in 2002.

Just so it's clear for the record, I will take these allegations with a grain of salt. Obviously they are allegations. And so I, again, will note for the record, as I have mentioned the earlier allegations made by the defendant's ex-spouse, that obviously they are allegations and they are currently part of the report. And so I will accept them as that.

However, that being said, the allegations as set forth do not appear to be as farfetched as one might think. And I think perhaps the most probative or more probative information that I have is the defendant's own statement.

2.2

And we can discuss that further, but the defendant, by his own admission, indicates that he had a sexual attraction to girls between the age of six and twelve.

And he said, "Prior to 2005 when I had the GSI conviction, or incident, my daughter would bring over girlfriends to our residence. At times I did find some of these girls to be sexually attractive. I did use them for masturbatory fantasies." And he indicated that he engaged in that conduct more than 50 times to various friends.

So it is not farfetched, unfortunately, to believe this defendant, with this unfortunate sickness, the desire for these children -- again, these other incidents, again, it is not too farfetched to believe that he may have engaged in the conduct.

And I don't use that as a specific basis of the Court's sentence, but, you know, his statements are, again, the most important part of assessing those matters.

As far as the sentencing disparities, defendants with similar records and conduct, there is the U.S. Sentencing Commission compiles sentencing data comparing offenses in each of the six criminal history categories. The data for this defendant's offense of conviction for fiscal year 2017 is as follows:

The national sentences for individuals with a criminal history category of II who are convicted of child

pornography offenses is 190 months.

Considering that the instant offense involves the defendant's second sexual offense conviction in 12 years, the probation officer has recommended a sentence about or above -- I should say about the national average is the best to ensure public safety.

And the guidelines and the sentencing disparities are, again, based upon in many ways various judges around the country varying for various reasons.

And so I think that in many ways we have wide-ranging disparities because of the views, the differing views of various judicial officers regarding the child pornography quidelines.

Before I turn to the need for the sentence imposed,
I'm required to address, and I will address, the arguments
that have been raised by counsel for the defendant in terms
of trying to decide a sentence. And so I want to
acknowledge the arguments that have been made by the
defendant for any reviewing court. I'll note that I'm going
to try to address each in turn, given the numbers and the
volume of those arguments.

Counsel for the defendant, you can correct me if for some reason I don't address each argument that you've raised.

I'll address the general argument regarding the

guidelines and whether the inherent flaw is in the child pornography guidelines. Again, I will adopt my own view, and I've written other opinions on these issues.

I think at least for the most part the guidelines are appropriate in these type of cases. And I don't believe that, particularly in this type of case, the guidelines are, the use of the guidelines is inappropriate. And I do not disagree with them on policy grounds or policy reasons.

And I say that for several reasons. Even with the guidelines, we do have the ability to vary based upon the various 18:3553(a) factors. I've used that in the past. I will continue to use that.

In those cases where I think the guidelines are excessive or greater than necessary, then I will obviously exercise that discretion.

But as a policy matter, I think the guidelines are an appropriate starting point. As a policy matter, I think we owe it at least -- and I will not comment on other jurists. They're free to do as they wish. I think my duty is to apply the statute, apply the law.

And I think in this case, these type of cases, the one thing that we continue to miss and that jurists continue to miss, yes, we need to consider the history and characteristics of the defendant, their background and their experience.

But I think far too often, as I've said in the past, we sanitize these images because we describe them in detail in our reports. But they are sanitized images. We talk about sadomasochistic conduct or pictures or images. We try to attach big terms and big words to these pictures.

These are the pictures of little children at the worst moment of their lives. And make no mistake, these are -- many of these cases, these are little children.

Instead of focusing on the offender, we also need to add balance, as judges, to the focus on the victims. These victims, as I have the victim impact statements, these are victims that have been, their pictures were taken, some of them, many years ago. They continue to be victimized, constantly victimized, because their images are out there on the Internet.

And when you say the use of a computer is in every case, well, yes, it is. And the use of the computer is extremely damaging. It's harmful. It is what makes these types of cases so prolific, and why we have so many is because we have the Internet and the ability to worldwide share these images, and because worse than that, the victims are victimized over and over.

It's not like a bank robbery where the bank teller is robbed and she, of course, is terrified because the robber may have a gun. And that passes, and she may be able to

seek counseling and that is a one-time occurrence. In these cases, these children are continually victimized.

Continually victimized.

So as a jurist, I don't disagree. I have a policy. I think the guidelines are appropriate. My policy is that we need to send a very strong message to individuals — this is individual—type sentencing — that these type of cases need serious consideration, and that lengthy sentences are most frequently needed in these kind of cases because individuals that in some way, shape, or form, as in this defendant, even worse than others, obtain sexual gratification from watching children — and I say this because that's frequently what they are — little babies and children being raped. Those people are dangerous individuals in the community. And they need to be incarcerated. They need to be deterred. And then they need to receive treatment once they are released back into the community.

And then returning to this particular case, the defendant, of course, having addressed the guidelines, I acknowledge the defendant had a difficult upbringing. He was adopted and raised by adoptive parents. And I think he had challenges as a child. And I acknowledge that and the possible abuse and his difficult challenge.

I acknowledge his military career. And sadly, I hate to -- again, his military career, I acknowledge his service

to the country, but tragically, as he self-reported, his interest in children began while his service to the country was ongoing, began with children in the Philippines, 12 to 14, and that is where this all began.

So those are, again, all those things have to be taken into consideration.

I acknowledge the defendant has issues regarding depression and other described illnesses as set forth in the report. It appears he received psychiatric services.

Unfortunately, he did not, at least based on what we know so far, did not make a full disclosure on his attraction to children and the issues that are most severe and most compelling that bring him here today.

One might have hoped, Mr. Richards, you might have done that in the past. You are and were unbelievably candid about your interest in children and your prior sexual history involving children. And the fact that you do receive gratification from the mere touch, the way I read this report, I read your statement, these children, as they pass you in the restaurants and other places, even that type of contact with these children apparently triggers your desires. And that makes this case, again, even more difficult.

The arguments for a variance -- candidly, I've looked at this report. The argument about a variance for his

military service, a variance based upon his employment, you know, I acknowledge that. But then there is the other side of the equation, the double life, this activity and these children.

And the guidelines, as I've already talked about, and as I've used in the past, will continue to use, I think it's important, the report to Congress by the Sentencing Commission, I know it's somewhat dated now, 2012 was the report, much of it continues to remain relevant in my view. Much of it is important.

And the three characteristics we talked about earlier, the content of the offender's child pornography collection, the nature of it, the types of sexual conduct depicted in the images, the ages of the victims, the extent to which the offender has organized and maintained his collection over time, the degree is number one. Number two, the degree of the defendant's engagement with others, the Internet community. And then the history of engaging in sexually abusive exploitative or predatory conduct. And all three of those weigh against the defendant.

His collection is such as described in the report. It is a collection. Yes, we see substantially more. But the nature of the collection speaks for itself. I won't describe it, but it certainly does not work to the defendant's benefit.

In terms of his engagement with other offenders, we know he's involved in chats and chat rooms, and that makes, again, that is an indication that this is not — this is an individual who is clearly interested in not only child pornography but children.

His use of the names, the chat names of She's Ten and Kid -- pardon me -- but Kid Cunt for the use of his current Snapchat user names, according to the current case title, and so the use of one or both of those names obviously gives you some indication of the defendant's interest.

So I struggled to find a reason why the mandatory minimum is not appropriate here. And, again, I would point to any reviewing court the most compelling is the defendant's own statement which is completely forthcoming.

I don't know if that's a cry for help or what it might be, but his own self-admitted interest in children between the ages of six and twelve and his self-admitted prior conduct involving these children, again, make this a very extraordinarily difficult case for Mr. Richards and his attorney.

As far as the need for the sentence imposed, just punishment, adequate deterrence, protect the public, improve the offender's conduct and condition, the defendant has a history of sexually inappropriate conduct dating back many years. He's allegedly committed various uncharged sexual

offenses against strangers in the mall and minor relatives at family gatherings.

And, again, I make that reference, although, again, that evidence, that reference in the PSI is given much less weight than the defendant's own admissions.

We do have, it's unrefuted, his conviction of multiple counts of gross sexual imposition against his prepubescent daughter. He was incarcerated for 17 months, released in 2007.

The government does call to our attention — it's in their brief; it's unrefuted — that there was this incident in 2012 where agents interviewed Mr. Richards. One would have hoped that that would have triggered some concern on his part. But he was incarcerated. And then less than ten years after, this in 2007, the GSI, he was incarcerated. And then he was arrested for this conduct, the instant matter involving the defendant using peer—to—peer file sharing programs to receive and distribute numerous picture and video files of prepubescent children being sexually abused on the Internet.

And again, it's a challenge. Mr. Richards, I wish things were different. It is really a difficult case because of your history and your self-admitted ongoing interest in children.

I have a duty to protect the public and afford

adequate deterrence, and this is a serious offense, and these are serious offenses. But more importantly, your history and characteristics and your ongoing attraction to children make this so challenging.

And with all due respect, the Court will do the following: Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and 18 United States Code 3553(a), it will be the judgment of the Court the defendant, David Richards, is committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 230 months.

I'll set aside the ten months. I know there is a good argument to be made under most circumstances for the statutory maximum. And for the reasons only that the defendant did serve in the military for some period of time and also served the VA, and his education that he has earned over that period of time deserves some small consideration. And that will be the consideration that I provide.

When you're released from prison, you'll be placed on supervised release for the rest of your life. I believe based upon the statements of the defendant, his ongoing interest in children, a mandatory period of life is certainly called for.

And as it relates to the term of supervision, I would, once again, refer to the defendant's own statement as to his interest with children as well as his prior GSI. The

supervision will be needed and necessary.

I'll waive the fine.

The special assessment of \$100 is due immediately.

And then all the mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the Court in Part D will be put in place.

You must refrain from the unlawful use of a controlled substance, submit to one drug test within 15 days of being released from prison, and to at least two periodic drug tests as determined by the Court.

I will recommend the RDAP program. The defendant may have issues with alcohol and drugs. And so -- particularly alcohol, so we'll make the recommendation. Any type of treatment the defendant can receive would be to his benefit.

You must participate in the sex offense specific assessment. It's my order that when the defendant is released, if not sooner, and hopefully the Bureau of Prisons will become more — or has become more advanced, the defendant will receive a very detailed assessment and psychiatric evaluation regarding his issues to determine what if any treatment conditions can be put in place.

You're required to participate in any treatment program as to substance abuse, alcohol, what have you.

And the testing will be put in place. You can't tamper with that testing, that efficiency of that testing in any way.

And bear in mind, sir, you cannot possess, use a computer or electronic device or data storage devices or media without the prior written approval of your probation officer.

And your computers may be subject to a search as, again, a computer search, and that search will be consistent with the search and seizure provisions we put in place.

Your property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computers, any electronic communications or data storage devices or media may be subject to a search conducted by your probation officer.

Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation of release. And you must warn other occupants that the premises may be subject to a search pursuant to this condition.

You'll be required to cooperate and register under the Adam Walsh Act. And that is something similar, sir, to what you did when you were, I think for ten years, after you were released on the GSI. You'll be required to register under the sex offender registration act, notification act, sometimes called SORNA. Keep your registration current in each jurisdiction where you reside.

And no later than three business days after each change in name, residence, employment or student status appear in person in at least one of those jurisdictions and

inform the jurisdiction of all your changes. And as you approach your release date, I'm sure you'll be reminded. If you fail to -- if you violate or do violate, I should say, that condition, that could be a new federal offense punishable by up to ten years.

You may not possess or view any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made by or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, or sexually explicit conduct.

And most importantly among all of this is that you will participate in a sex offense specific treatment program, follow the rules of that program. And you will be supervised. You cannot access the Internet except for reasons given by your probation officer.

Your computer will be monitored, and you must allow software monitoring to be installed on your computer.

And you must allow the probation office to conduct periodic and limited searches of that computer. And that — to determine whether, again, there has been any problems or issues with that computer monitoring.

You cannot have contact -- again, this will trigger a violation, I'm sure you understand. You cannot seek, obtain, maintain any residence, employment, volunteer work, church, recreational activities involving minors, persons

under the age of 18, in any way without the prior express written approval of your probation officer.

You can't reside in direct view of schoolyards, parks, public swimming pools, playgrounds, youth centers, video arcades, or other places primarily used by persons under the age of 18.

And you can't loiter around any schoolyards, within 100 feet of schoolyards, playgrounds, theme parks, arcades, swimming pools, skating rinks, toy stores, other places where people under the age of 18 congregate or gather without the approval of your probation officer.

And your residence and employment must be approved by your probation officer. Any change in that must be -- again, those residence, employment must be approved by your probation officer. And you need to give your probation officer notice of those changes at least 20 days prior.

And you cannot reside within 1,000 yards -- or 1,000 feet of any school or daycare center without the express approval of your probation officer.

And given the circumstances here, you must consent to enhanced extensive home inspections which include examining under beds, mattresses, cabinets, closets, drawers, trash containers, other personal spaces to make sure that there is no child pornography in those premises or in those whereabouts, those areas.

Counsel for the government, any objections, corrections, any arguments that have not been previously raised under *Bostic* that I can address?

MS. SKUTNIK: Your Honor, no objections to the sentence. I would direct the Court's attention to the additional special assessment pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3014 that does apply to child exploitation cases within the time frame of the defendant's case.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

We will assess the \$5,000. And hopefully the defendant -- obviously during his period of incarceration, ten percent of his -- or 25 percent of what he may earn may be applied to those items, I would suspect, would be the method, manner, and means of perhaps paying that special assessment.

Counsel for the defendant, do you have any objections under Bostic?

MR. LAZARUS: Your Honor, first of all, we would object to the length of the sentence.

But as to the special assessment of \$5,000 under that 3014, if the Court makes a finding that he is indigent, the Court can waive that fine.

Mr. Richards cannot afford counsel. He has no money. He has been incarcerated and has no income. So we would ask that the Court waive the \$5,000 special assessment.

THE COURT: Well, the special assessment, as I understand it -- both sides can enlighten me if you would like -- is designed to compensate the victims of these type of offenses.

Am I correct?

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MS. SKUTNIK: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And we have in this case, attached to the government's sentencing memoranda, we have victim impact statements from victims who were part of this case whose pictures are available on the Internet. They're part of these various collections that make the rounds.

So I recognize the defendant is indigent. That does not mean that I cannot impose it, as I understand it. That I can impose it. And then the Bureau of Prisons can assess it as against any earnings he might have, given the length of his time of incarceration.

Am I mistaken? Again, I understand that I have some discretion, but it's a special assessment. The same applies with the \$100 special assessment. It's a bit different, but either side care to enlighten me?

MR. LAZARUS: Your Honor, we would just say that if we are talking about money that goes to the victims, that's what restitution is for. There has been no restitution claims.

But the Court does have discretion as to whether there

is a finding of indigency. And if there is a finding of 1 2 indigency in this case, the Court can waive that fine. 3 THE COURT: Is the defendant going to continue to 4 receive his VA disability? He has got a pension. He is on 5 disability. Will be continue to receive that disability 6 while he is incarcerated? 7 MR. LAZARUS: It's going to be reduced once they 8 reassess it. 9 THE COURT: Reduced in what amount? Is he going 10 to continue to receive money is the question? 11 MR. LAZARUS: He will receive some money, but it 12 won't be the same amount that he has been receiving. 13 don't know how much it will be reduced. 14 THE COURT: How much will it be? 15 MR. LAZARUS: We are not sure at this point. 16 THE COURT: Well, then I'll defer until such time 17 as you provide me with pertinent information about two 18 Number one, about the amount of disability he will 19 receive. Number two, whether he has any current ongoing 20 child support obligation. I think, according to the PSI, he 21 was paying \$536 a month toward child support. 22 So the question is, first of all, is he going to 23 continue to receive a benefit while he is incarcerated from 24 the VA? And what amount?

And then what other obligations does he have as it

25

pertains to child support?

So if you provide me that information, then I will make a final decision as to the special assessment.

Is that agreeable, counsel for the government?

MS. SKUTNIK: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And I am referring to the specific \$5,000.

Counsel for the defendant?

I'm sorry. I stand corrected. I should pull up the PSI. It's called Justice For Victims of Trafficking Act. So, again, that is what we are discussing here.

So, counsel, do you have any objection to proceeding in that fashion before I make a final decision?

MR. LAZARUS: How would you like us to inform you?

THE COURT: Well, your client worked for the VA in the human resources department. Hopefully there is someone there who either you can reach out or he knows who you can discuss with them what will be the consequence now that he has been sentenced, what will be the effect on his disability. And then you can reach out to opposing counsel, maybe come to some agreement. If you can't, then I'll be glad to, again, hear from you and to allow you to provide me the information.

You say he is indigent. He may be indigent, but if he

has continuing monthly income while he is incarcerated, 1 2 that's, I think, relevant to whether or not I should impose 3 the \$5,000. I think it's also relevant if he has another 4 obligation. I'm repeating myself a bit. If he has child 5 support that's continuing on, then that child support 6 deserves and needs the support which he is responsible for. 7 And that might have a bearing on whether the \$5,000, whether 8 I defer the 5,000 as opposed to making sure the income money goes to the child, support of the child. 9 10 Do you have any questions, sir? 11 MR. LAZARUS: Me or Mr. Richards? 12 THE COURT: Either one. If Mr. Richards knows, 13 he can tell us now. Then we can go ahead and decide. 14 MR. LAZARUS: No. I discussed it with him. He 15 doesn't know. 16 THE COURT: What is his current monthly benefit? MR. LAZARUS: We'll have to look into it. 17 18 THE COURT: I mean, has it been accruing since 19 you have been incarcerated? 20 THE DEFENDANT: Child support, Your Honor? 21 THE COURT: I assume the child support is coming 22 directly out of your check. 23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, it does. 24 THE COURT: So why don't you find out how much 25 it's going to be reduced. It may not be reduced at all if

the money is going directly to child support.

I want to be fair to both sides before I decide whether to impose it or not. I want to be sure if you have the ability to pay it from your disability benefit while you're incarcerated, then that is something I will consider. If you have child support obligations that will eat up most of your benefit, then that's a different matter.

How old is the child, the youngest child? Refresh my memory.

THE DEFENDANT: Thirteen, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So you have another five years of support for her.

So let's find out the answer to those questions, Mr. Lazarus, and then we will put up a final order either granting the government's request or denying it subject to the child support, all right.

Is that acceptable?

MR. LAZARUS: Yes, Your Honor. We'll do our best.

THE COURT: Mr. Richards, you have a right to an appeal filed from the Court's sentence. I'm sure Mr. Lazarus will advise you. We will put up an order setting forth your offense. You'll be provided the transcripts, all the necessary papers. We'll appoint an attorney for purposes of the appeal. We'll make certain that, again, you

have all that information.

And again, the other closing comment I would make, sir, with all due respect, you have a serious problem, a serious issue. And hopefully at some point, again, you'll be able to receive treatment.

I know there is a treatment program in the Bureau of Prisons. Unfortunately, that program, typically you don't qualify until later on in the term of your sentence.

But hopefully you'll receive a very thorough evaluation, and then a treatment plan can be put in place.

Thank you very much.

MS. SKUTNIK: Your Honor, two matters.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. SKUTNIK: First is that the government would move to dismiss Count 2 of the indictment.

THE COURT: It will be dismissed, Count 2.

MS. SKUTNIK: And the second request I have of the Court, the Court asked the *Bostic* question and counsel responded. He objected to the length of the sentence, which I do not believe is stated with any particular specificity as to what it is that he's objecting to.

So I would ask the Court if Mr. Lazarus could be asked to articulate what it is that he's objecting to since he does have an appellate right in this case.

THE COURT: Is there something more specific you

would like to add for the record, sir?

MR. LAZARUS: We just believe in consideration of all the 3553(a) factors, that a more significant variance below 230 months is warranted. We would ask the Court to consider that under *Bostic*.

THE COURT: All right. I'll note for the record that I've considered the argument. I'll simply restate the reasons I've already imposed the Court's sentence.

And, again, primarily as I've indicated, I've imposed the 230, below the 240 statutory maximum. I'll note for the record the statutory maximum was the recommendation of the probation staff.

I'll further note, just again to address the reasons for the Court's sentence, the length, in the *Bostic* context, is that, as I've indicated, it is very difficult for the Court to vary down any significant extent based upon the defendant's own self-admitted attraction to children.

And by his own admission "I'm sexually" -- I'm quoting from his own statement -- "I'm sexually attracted to female minors and female adults. Pertaining to female minors, my sexual preference is for girls between the ages of six to twelve years old."

And then go on, again, to review the earlier statements of the defendant, with his history of attraction to children, and his prior history, his prior GSI, and all

| 1 | the other matters is what, again, outside of the guidelines, |
|----|--|
| 2 | makes a downward variance further than the ten months I've |
| 3 | granted, at least in my view, not warranted. |
| 4 | And so I understand that. I make those statements, |
| 5 | and again, I refer to the statement of the defendant in this |
| 6 | report of Homeland Security. |
| 7 | Thank you very much, counsel. We appreciate your |
| 8 | courtesy. |
| 9 | Let us know, Mr. Lazarus, about the information |
| 10 | regarding the additional \$5,000. |
| 11 | (Proceedings concluded at 4:20 p.m.) |
| 12 | |
| 13 | CERTIFICATE |
| 14 | |
| 15 | I certify that the forgoing is a correct |
| 16 | transcript from the record of proceedings in the |
| 17 | above-entitled matter. |
| 18 | |
| 19 | S/Caroline Mahnke 5/7/2019 |
| 20 | Caroline Mahnke, RMR, CRR, CRC Date |
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